Magdalena Kaufmann

26 Apr 2013, 2pm-3:30pm, Manchester 227

The truth and appropriateness of statements and instructions about what is the best thing to do (as expressed by declarative sentences containing deontic modals and imperative sentences) can depend on the information that is or will be available to the relevant agent at the time of choice. Moreover, antecedents of conditionals can sometimes behave as if supplying the relevant information for modals or imperatives in the consequent. These interactions between what counts as the best or optimal action for an agent and what information is available poses problems for standard treatments of deontic modals and conditionals in formal semantics. I will start by introducing Cariani, Kaufmann & Kaufmann’s (forthcoming) treatment of the miners’ paradox (Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010), and I will then focus on the influence of subjunctive marking on German modals and point out possible connections to recent work on the distinction between weak and strong necessity modals (like ‘ought’ vs. ‘have to’).

Igor Yanovich

29 Mar 2013, 2pm-3:30pm, Manchester 227

The proper analysis of “weak” vs. “strong” necessity deontics (should and ought vs. must and have to) and the scopal interaction of different deontics with negation are two topics much discussed in the recent literature. In this talk, I will present data from Russian that shed new light on both, underscoring the importance of using cross-linguistic data when considering universal semantic issues. The thread uniting the two topics will be the importance of advice modality.

Russian features a rich deontic system, with more than half a dozen of necessity deontics. I will show that this rich system does not contain a single categorical contrast between weak and strong necessity, as in English. Instead, different tests commonly used for English as well as other languages (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou 2008) as all targeting the same distinction turn out to divide the Russian deontic space into different groupings. Thus the category of weak necessity is no more than an illusion created by the interplay of several independent properties which do not have much to do with the strength of modal force.

One of such properties is the ability of a given modal to be used as (for lack of a better term) an advice modal. “Advice modality” seems to be a special type of modality, comparable to such categories as teleological or metaphysical modality. It seems to be characterized by three properties: 1) it chooses one of the possible alternative courses of actions, thus solving a certain decision problem; 2) it needs to be endorsed by the speaker in matrix contexts, and by the attitude bearer under attitudes; 3) it always scopes over clausemate negation. All English modals that can be used as advice modals have other readings as well, but Russian features modal stoit that conveniently can only be used in advice. Furthermore, for most Russian necessity deontics, relative scope with negation is not fixed, unlike in English, Greek, Dutch, German, Spanish (cf. Iatridou and Zeijlstra 2013). This creates a convenient testing ground. I will describe that modal’s behavior compared to other modals of Russian and English, and discuss how the three properties of advice modality may be related to each other.

Stewart Shapiro

14 Mar 2013, 4pm-5:30pm, Manchester 227

We develop a point-free construction of the classical one-dimensional continuum, with an interval structure based on mereology and either a weak set theory or logic of plural quantification. In some respects this realizes ideas going back to Aristotle, although, unlike Aristotle, we make free use of contemporary actual infinity. Also, in contrast to intuitionistic analysis, Bishop’s constructive analysis, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, we follow classical analysis in allowing partitioning of our “gunky line” into mutually exclusive and exhaustive disjoint parts, thereby demonstrating the independence of “indecomposability” from a non-punctiform conception. It is surprising that such simple axioms as ours already imply the Archimedean property and the interval analogue of Dedekind completeness (least-upper-bound principle), and that they determine an isomorphism with the Dedekind-Cantor structure of R as a complete, separable, ordered field. We also present some simple topological models of our system, establishing consistency relative to classical analysis. Finally, after describing how to nominalize our theory, we close with comparisons with earlier efforts related to our own.

Keith Simmons

18 Jan 2013, 4pm-6pm, FS 216

There are paradoxes of reference (Richard, Berry, KÓ§nig), paradoxes of predication (Russell), and paradoxes of truth (the Liar). I argue that there is a phenomenon that cuts across all of these semantic paradoxes: given a paradoxical expression, we can produce an expression composed of the very same words that is not defective, but instead has a definite semantic value. Call this phenomenon Repetition. I critically examine Kripke’s and Field’s responses to Repetition in the case of truth. I suggest an alternative response – a contextual account according to which our semantic concepts apply everywhere except for certain ‘singular points’. Now any account of the semantic paradoxes is vulnerable to ‘revenge’: new forms of the Liar that the account cannot handle. Repetition is one manifestation of revenge, and I go on to consider revenge more broadly. I argue that even dialetheism — according to which there are true contradictions — is subject to revenge. And I suggest a way we might approach revenge along singularity lines.

Jan Reimann

13 Apr 2012, 2pm-4pm, Class of 1947 Room

In mathematical logic, one tries to classify objects by their descriptive complexity, for example, how many quantifier changes are needed to define a given subset of the natural numbers. On the other hand, concepts like entropy allow for a measure-theoretic classification of complex, i.e. random, behavior.

Both approaches can be combined to define a notion of randomness for individual objects such as infinite binary sequences. I will discuss the resulting interplay between probability and definability. I will argue that the view from logic opens up new and perhaps unexpected perspectives on the concept of randomness, for example, concerning the role of infinity.

Nilanjan Bhowmick

4 Nov 2011, 2pm-4pm, Manchester 227

Complex demonstratives (“That F”) are taken to be devices of reference, somewhat like names. But there is evidence to suggest that they are quantifiers. The evidence comes from both linguistics (ACD, WCO) and philosophy. In the talk, I will argue that the evidence holds good against a number of criticisms. A different logical form for complex demonstratives will be argued for from those suggested by King (2001) and Ludwig and Lepore (2002). If my arguments prove right, it seems that intentions play no part in the semantics of complex demonstratives. And complex demonstratives do not give any evidence for a privileged division of the objects of the world.

Rick Nouwen

28 Oct 2011, 2pm-4pm, Manchester 227

Ignorance without disjunction? The implicatures of numeral modifiers

It has been observed (Geurts & Nouwen 2007) that certain numeral statements, particularly those involving the modifier “at least”, give rise to ignorance implicatures. For instance, (i) implies that the speaker does not know the exact number of journalists who contacted Bill.

(i) At least three journalists contacted Bill.

These inferences are reminiscent of ignorance implicatures that show up with disjunctive statements. (“Either Bob or Bill is guilty” implies that the speaker doesn’t know who is guilty). In fact, one could argue that (i) expresses a disjunction: exactly 3 journalists contacted Bill or more than 3 journalists contacted him. In this talk I will argue that this line of reasoning is too simplistic, both from a logical and from a linguistic point of view.

Tamina Stephenson

15 Oct 2010, 2:00pm-4.00pm, Manchester 227

This talk will discuss a number of phenomena in natural language semantics where it is useful to replace the traditional role of possible worlds with centered possible worlds (world-individual pairs). I will try to show that enough such areas exist that it is worth making this move uniformly throughout our semantic theory.

Specific linguistic phenomena to be touched on (time permitting) include “control” constructions such as x wants to V, shifting indexical pronouns such as Amharic ‘I,’ “logophoric” pronouns in certain languages, epistemic modals such as might and must, taste predicates such as tasty and fun, and certain uses of the attitude predicates imagine and remember.

In the process, my hope is to show people from neighboring fields why this technical choice between worlds and centered worlds is interesting within the context of natural language semantics, and also to gather input on what ways or to what extent the interest may go beyond this theory-internal question.

Philippe Schlenker

24 Oct 2008, 2:00pm, Class of 1947 Room

We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a simple language in which semantic paradoxes (whether purely logical or empirical) can be expressed. We start from a non-quantificational language L which contains a truth predicate and sentence names, and we associate to each sentence F of L an infinite series of translations h0(F), h1(F), …, stated in a quantificational language L*. Under certain conditions, we show that (i) none of the translations is self-referential, but that (ii) any one of them perfectly mirrors the semantic behavior of the original. The result, which can be seen as a generalization of recent work by Yablo (1993, 2004) and Cook (2004), shows that under certain conditions self-reference is not essential to any of the semantic phenomena that can be obtained in a simple language.