Jan Reimann

13 Apr 2012, 2pm-4pm, Class of 1947 Room

In mathematical logic, one tries to classify objects by their descriptive complexity, for example, how many quantifier changes are needed to define a given subset of the natural numbers. On the other hand, concepts like entropy allow for a measure-theoretic classification of complex, i.e. random, behavior.

Both approaches can be combined to define a notion of randomness for individual objects such as infinite binary sequences. I will discuss the resulting interplay between probability and definability. I will argue that the view from logic opens up new and perhaps unexpected perspectives on the concept of randomness, for example, concerning the role of infinity.

Nilanjan Bhowmick

4 Nov 2011, 2pm-4pm, Manchester 227

Complex demonstratives (“That F”) are taken to be devices of reference, somewhat like names. But there is evidence to suggest that they are quantifiers. The evidence comes from both linguistics (ACD, WCO) and philosophy. In the talk, I will argue that the evidence holds good against a number of criticisms. A different logical form for complex demonstratives will be argued for from those suggested by King (2001) and Ludwig and Lepore (2002). If my arguments prove right, it seems that intentions play no part in the semantics of complex demonstratives. And complex demonstratives do not give any evidence for a privileged division of the objects of the world.

Rick Nouwen

28 Oct 2011, 2pm-4pm, Manchester 227

Ignorance without disjunction? The implicatures of numeral modifiers

It has been observed (Geurts & Nouwen 2007) that certain numeral statements, particularly those involving the modifier “at least”, give rise to ignorance implicatures. For instance, (i) implies that the speaker does not know the exact number of journalists who contacted Bill.

(i) At least three journalists contacted Bill.

These inferences are reminiscent of ignorance implicatures that show up with disjunctive statements. (“Either Bob or Bill is guilty” implies that the speaker doesn’t know who is guilty). In fact, one could argue that (i) expresses a disjunction: exactly 3 journalists contacted Bill or more than 3 journalists contacted him. In this talk I will argue that this line of reasoning is too simplistic, both from a logical and from a linguistic point of view.

Tamina Stephenson

15 Oct 2010, 2:00pm-4.00pm, Manchester 227

This talk will discuss a number of phenomena in natural language semantics where it is useful to replace the traditional role of possible worlds with centered possible worlds (world-individual pairs). I will try to show that enough such areas exist that it is worth making this move uniformly throughout our semantic theory.

Specific linguistic phenomena to be touched on (time permitting) include “control” constructions such as x wants to V, shifting indexical pronouns such as Amharic ‘I,’ “logophoric” pronouns in certain languages, epistemic modals such as might and must, taste predicates such as tasty and fun, and certain uses of the attitude predicates imagine and remember.

In the process, my hope is to show people from neighboring fields why this technical choice between worlds and centered worlds is interesting within the context of natural language semantics, and also to gather input on what ways or to what extent the interest may go beyond this theory-internal question.

Philippe Schlenker

24 Oct 2008, 2:00pm, Class of 1947 Room

We provide a systematic recipe for eliminating self-reference from a simple language in which semantic paradoxes (whether purely logical or empirical) can be expressed. We start from a non-quantificational language L which contains a truth predicate and sentence names, and we associate to each sentence F of L an infinite series of translations h0(F), h1(F), …, stated in a quantificational language L*. Under certain conditions, we show that (i) none of the translations is self-referential, but that (ii) any one of them perfectly mirrors the semantic behavior of the original. The result, which can be seen as a generalization of recent work by Yablo (1993, 2004) and Cook (2004), shows that under certain conditions self-reference is not essential to any of the semantic phenomena that can be obtained in a simple language.